The section numbers moved in a way that catches people out, the text barely changed, and almost everything that decides one of these cases is about the mind rather than the wound. What has to be proved, what the medical report does and does not settle, and what actually happens in Delhi.
Attempt to murder — the old IPC 307 — is now Section 109 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. Attempt to culpable homicide — the old IPC 308 — is now Section 110. The text of both is a near-verbatim carry-over, so all the Penal Code case law continues to apply directly.
We are putting this first because it is the most immediately useful thing on the page, and because we could not find it flagged anywhere else.
| What it covers | Old IPC | New BNS | Changed? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attempt to murder | 307 | 109(1) and 109(2) | One addition — see below |
| Attempt to commit culpable homicide | 308 | 110 | Nothing at all |
| General provision for attempts | 511 | 62 | No |
| Attempt to commit suicide | 309 | No successor — not re-enacted | Repealed |
| Culpable homicide — definition | 299 | 100 | No |
| Murder — definition | 300 | 101 | Clause labels re-lettered |
| Murder — punishment | 302 | 103(1) | No |
| Culpable homicide not amounting to murder | 304 | 105 | A statutory minimum was introduced |
| Abetment — punishment where no express provision | 109 | 49 | Renumbered |
| Voluntarily causing grievous hurt | 325 | 117(2) | No |
| Grievous hurt by dangerous weapons | 326 | 118(2) | No |
| Robbery or dacoity with attempt to cause death | 397 | 311 | No |
| Attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed | 398 | 312 | No |
Section 109 has two sub-sections. There is no 109(3).
"Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."
"When any person offending under sub-section (1) is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, which shall mean the remainder of that person's natural life."
Section 109(2) requires two things together, and it is a narrow provision: the offender must already be under a sentence of imprisonment for life, and hurt must have been caused. It is the successor to the second paragraph of IPC 307.
There is no statutory minimum anywhere in Section 109. And note the phrasing — "shall also be liable to fine" is a power, not a mandatory fine.
Section 109 retains four illustrations from the Penal Code, and two of them are the most useful thing on this whole page, because they are the statute's own worked examples of where preparation ends and attempt begins.
| Illustration | The point |
|---|---|
| Firing at a person with intent to kill | The offence, even though no consequence is stated |
| Exposing a child in a place where it may die, though the child survives | The offence |
| Buying and loading a gun | NOT the offence. Firing it is |
| Buying poison and mixing it into food | NOT the offence. Delivering the food is |
Those last two are law, not commentary. When a court is asked where preparation ends, this is the line Parliament itself drew.
Compare the two codes side by side and the answer is almost nothing.
| Situation | IPC | BNS | Changed? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attempt to murder, no hurt caused | Up to 10 years, liable to fine | Same | No |
| Attempt to murder, hurt caused | Liable to imprisonment for life, or as above | Same | No |
| Attempt by a person under sentence of life, hurt caused | Death only | Death, or imprisonment for the remainder of natural life | Yes — an alternative was added |
| Attempt to culpable homicide, no hurt | Up to 3 years, or fine, or both | Same | No |
| Attempt to culpable homicide, hurt caused | Up to 7 years, or fine, or both | Same | No |
| General attempt provision | Half of life, or half the longest term | Same | No |
So pages claiming the Sanhita "increased the punishment for attempt to murder", "introduced a minimum sentence" or "made the fine mandatory" are wrong on all three counts. The practical consequence is a good one: because the text is identical, every Penal Code judgment on Section 307 applies unchanged to Section 109.
Section 110 is a single section with two limbs and no sub-sections. Several pages invent a "110(1)" and "110(2)"; those do not exist.
"Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
The section retains its illustration, and the illustration is the key to the whole 109-versus-110 argument: a person who, under grave and sudden provocation, fires a pistol at another in circumstances where death would have been culpable homicide not amounting to murder has committed this offence — not attempt to murder. The provocation is what moves it.
Section 62 is the general attempt provision, the successor to IPC 511. It punishes an attempt with up to half of the imprisonment provided for the offence attempted — and it carries two illustrations, including the classic one about a pickpocket reaching into an empty pocket, which is why impossibility of success is no defence.
| Section | Punishment | Cognizable | Bailable | Court | Compoundable | Limitation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 109(1) | Up to 10 years and fine; life if hurt caused | Yes | No | Court of Session | No | None |
| 109(2) | Death, or natural life | Yes | No | Court of Session | No | None |
| 110 — no hurt | Up to 3 years, or fine, or both | Yes | No | Court of Session | No | 3 years |
| 110 — hurt caused | Up to 7 years, or fine, or both | Yes | No | Court of Session | No | None |
| 117(2) — grievous hurt | Up to 7 years and fine | Yes | Yes | Any Magistrate | Yes, with permission | None |
| 118(2) — grievous hurt by weapon | Life, or 1 to 10 years, and fine | Yes | No | Magistrate 1st class | No | None |
Nothing about the classification of attempt to murder changed. It was cognizable, non-bailable, Sessions-triable and non-compoundable under the Penal Code, and it still is.
The orthodox account has four stages — intention, preparation, attempt, commission. The first two are generally not punishable. Attempt is where liability begins, and the whole question is where the line sits.
Indian law does not use the English "last act" test. In a decision of 1961 the Supreme Court held that a person commits an attempt when he intends to commit the offence and does an act towards its commission — and that such an act need not be the penultimate act. A forged application posted to a university was held to have entered the realm of attempt the moment it was despatched.
A companion decision of the same day, on Section 307 itself, held that the section covers a series of acts rather than one instantaneous act, and that a conviction is possible although the act was not the final step and no fatal injury resulted.
The academic literature offers several competing tests — proximity, the point at which the accused could still have drawn back, whether the act unequivocally points to the intended offence, and whether impossibility matters. They are useful in argument. But for a person trying to understand where they stand, the statute's own illustrations do the work better: buying and loading the gun is preparation; firing it is attempt. Buying poison and mixing it into food is preparation; delivering the food is attempt.
In a judgment of July 2024 the Supreme Court put the requirement compactly: a conviction may be justified only where the accused possessed intent coupled with some overt act in aid of its execution. So there are two ingredients:
The statutory formula — that the act must be done in such circumstances that, had it caused death, it would have been murder — is a counterfactual test of the quality of the act together with the accompanying state of mind. It is not self-executing. The Court has said in terms that ascertaining intention remains a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each case.
Can there be a conviction where nobody was injured at all? Yes, and three things converge on that answer. The section prescribes a punishment for the attempt on its own and only then adds "and if hurt is caused" as an escalation — so the base case is an attempt with no hurt, and the first limb would otherwise be surplusage. The first illustration is a person firing at another with intent to kill, with no stated consequence. And the 1961 authority upheld a conviction where no fatal injury was inflicted.
There are two lines of Supreme Court authority here, and most pages carry one of them and get the law half right. They are not in conflict, and putting them together is the single most useful thing this page can do.
| The proposition | What it means |
|---|---|
| A minor injury does not defeat the charge | The Supreme Court held in 1983 that it is not necessary for bodily harm capable of causing death to have been inflicted. In 2015 it added that an accused cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries were simple, and that injury to a vital part is not an essential ingredient. An earlier decision put it more strongly still: where the act was done with the avowed object of causing death, the nature, extent or character of the injury, and whether it was sufficient to cause death, are factors wholly irrelevant. And in September 2024 the Court restored a charge that a High Court had discharged, holding that the extent of the injuries is not relevant if the intent is present, and that intention is a question of fact and not of law. |
| A grave injury does not establish it | In May 2026 the Supreme Court held that the gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative unless the prosecution establishes the required mental element, and that the seriousness of an injury even if opined as "dangerous to life" is by itself not conclusive of an attempt to murder. The conviction was altered down to voluntarily causing grievous hurt. A 2023 decision had reached a similar result where there had been no repeated or severe blows. |
The May 2026 judgment has been distilled into a checklist, and it is the most usable practical content available in this area.
| Factor | What is weighed |
|---|---|
| 1. The weapon | A firearm, sword or knife points one way; an ordinary stick or lathi points the other. The question is whether the thing is normally used to cause death or merely hurt. |
| 2. Words spoken during the incident | Threats to kill, or to not leave the person alive. |
| 3. Motive or prior enmity | A long-standing dispute supports intention. The absence of prior enmity points towards a sudden quarrel. |
| 4. The part of the body targeted | Head, chest, neck, abdomen — or a non-vital part. Repeated targeting of vital parts weighs heavily. |
| 5. Nature and extent of the injuries | Depth, location, multiplicity, seriousness. |
| 6. Force and manner of the assault | Number of blows, ferocity, and whether the accused persisted after the other person had fallen or become helpless. |
A Delhi High Court decision of August 2026 added a further circumstance that belongs on a Delhi page: post-incident conduct is relevant to intention. Where the accused had promptly arranged hospital treatment for the injured person, the Court held that such conduct, though not by itself determinative, is nevertheless a relevant circumstance in examining the ingredients of the offence — and acquitted.
This page explains the law in general terms. It cannot tell you what to do about your own facts — only an advocate who has read your papers can do that. You can look through the advocates associated with Legal Space Services who practise in criminal matters, see their enrolment details and areas of practice, and send a consultation request. Searching and sending a request are free.
This is the most valuable submission available in this area and it is essentially absent from public explainers.
Both sections are drafted as counterfactuals. Section 109 asks: would the act, had it caused death, have been murder? Section 110 asks: would it have been culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
It follows that every argument available on a murder charge is available on an attempt charge. The Exceptions that reduce murder to culpable homicide — grave and sudden provocation, a sudden fight without premeditation and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner, and exceeding the right of private defence — do exactly the same work here. If the facts would have attracted an Exception, the correct charge is Section 110 and not Section 109, even though the accused's physical conduct was identical.
Parliament supplied the worked example itself, in the illustration to Section 110: a person who fires a pistol under grave and sudden provocation commits that offence, not attempt to murder.
The other characterisation fight is against the hurt provisions, and the two families of offence sit on different conceptual planes. Grievous hurt looks backwards at the harm caused. Attempt to murder looks forward at the harm intended. One is a result crime; the other is an intent crime.
The discriminators that actually decide cases are the six factors above, and in practice: whether the weapon was inherently deadly; whether there was premeditation or a sudden quarrel; whether the assault was repeated and persistent or a single blow in a scuffle; what was said; and what the accused did afterwards.
Alteration runs downward freely. Reducing attempt to murder to grievous hurt at the appellate stage is the commonest outcome in this area — it happened in the May 2026 Supreme Court decision, in a 2023 Supreme Court decision, and in reported High Court decisions from 2024 onwards. It does not run upward: the Delhi High Court has held that attempt to murder is not a "minor offence" in relation to voluntarily causing hurt, so a person charged only with the lesser offence cannot be convicted of the greater. (We were not able to obtain the case name for that holding, so we state the proposition without a citation. It is doctrinally sound — the minor-offence power runs downward, not upward — but have it checked before it is relied on.)
In practice the section on the FIR is chosen largely on the doctor's opinion in the medico-legal report. A "dangerous to life" endorsement, or the use of a firearm or a bladed weapon, drives registration under Section 109. A grievous opinion tends towards Section 117(2) or 118(2), and a simple opinion towards the lesser hurt provisions.
There is a related conflation that causes more trouble than any other in this area, and it is worth naming. The grievous-hurt definition includes "any hurt which endangers life". That is a different thing from a medical opinion that a wound was dangerous to life, and both are different again from an intention to cause death. The May 2026 judgment is essentially a correction of that conflation.
Documents that can move the section as the case develops: the subsequent or final medical opinion, issued after the treating unit reviews imaging and the course of treatment — this frequently changes the classification; the discharge summary; the seizure memo for the weapon; the forensic science laboratory report; and the record of the forensic visit to the scene described below.
The gap between Section 109 and Section 110 is not just sentence length. It is the entire pre-trial regime, and no page we found sets this out.
| Protection | Section 109 | Section 110 |
|---|---|---|
| Notice of appearance instead of arrest — the regime for offences punishable up to seven years, which the Supreme Court held in January 2026 makes the notice the rule and arrest the exception | Not available. Ten years and life exposure puts it outside | Available. Both limbs cap at three and seven years |
| Preliminary enquiry before FIR — available for offences of three years or more but less than seven | Not available. Registration is mandatory | Arguably available for the aggravated limb; the base limb sits exactly at three years and whether that qualifies is unresolved |
| Default bail period | 90 days where hurt was caused and life is engaged. Where no hurt was caused, there is a live argument for 60 | 60 days |
| Sentence exposure | Life where hurt is caused | Seven years, or three where no hurt |
Anticipatory bail is available. There is no statutory bar for Section 109, and the application lies to the Court of Session or the High Court. Regular bail, the offence being exclusively Sessions-triable, lies to the Sessions Court and thereafter the High Court.
In the one reported decision we found that applies Section 109 by its new number, a High Court granted anticipatory bail in August 2025. The reasoning is worth setting out, because it is transferable:
The investigation time limit is ninety days for offences punishable with death, life, or imprisonment for ten years or more, and sixty days otherwise. The Sanhita changed the wording from "not less than ten years" to "ten years or more", and a High Court held in December 2024 that this is only a play of words — that the threshold still refers to the minimum punishment imposable, so an offence punishable merely up to ten years stays on the sixty-day track. The Supreme Court declined to disturb that, but by an order giving no reasons, so the point is not settled nationally.
| Situation | What is engaged | Default bail period |
|---|---|---|
| Section 109(1), hurt caused | Imprisonment for life is expressly available | 90 days — uncontroversial |
| Section 109(1), no hurt caused | Maximum ten years, no minimum | Arguably 60 days — contested |
| Section 109(2) | Death or natural life | 90 days |
| Section 110, either limb | Three or seven years | 60 days |
In a no-hurt Section 109 case there is a real and currently live argument that the charge-sheet must be filed within sixty days and that default bail accrues thereafter. It is contested, and we present it as contested — but it is worth thirty days of liberty and it is almost never made.
Compounding is not possible. The compounding provision says in terms that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by it, and its two tables are exhaustive. Neither Section 109 nor Section 110 appears in either.
Quashing on settlement is a different thing from compounding, and the High Court's inherent power survives the non-compoundable classification. But it is not exercised as a matter of course. The Supreme Court's guidance requires the court to weigh the severity and nature of the offence, satisfy itself that the compromise is genuine and voluntary, and consider the societal impact. The controlling decision requires an examination of the nature of the injury, whether it was inflicted on vital or delicate parts of the body, and the nature of the weapon used — and holds that this should normally be done only after the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet filed. So an attempt-to-murder FIR will not ordinarily be quashed at the pre-charge-sheet stage.
Has it actually been done? Yes, including in Delhi.
| Outcome | What the court did |
|---|---|
| Quashed — Delhi High Court, March 2026 | An FIR registered under IPC 308 with charges framed under IPC 307 was quashed on a compromise, where the relationship between the parties was akin to that of a mother and child and continuing the prosecution would have been a travesty of justice. Conditions were imposed — thirty sessions of community service of three hours each over four months at a hospital, together with an open-court acknowledgement and a waiver of property claims. (Published reports differ on the spelling of the petitioner's name, so we describe the case without naming it.) |
| Quashed — Supreme Court, February 2025 | Held that the mere mention of the attempt-to-murder section in an FIR does not bar quashing on settlement where the allegations do not make out the offence. On the facts, a finger fracture was the only injury. |
| Refused — Delhi High Court, September 2021 | Declined to quash where a stabbing had caused injuries capable of causing death in the ordinary course. Such a case is a crime against society rather than a private dispute, and does not become quashable merely because money has changed hands. |
Four provisions in the new procedure code have no predecessor in the old one, and they matter in an attempt case on both sides.
| The provision | What it gives you |
|---|---|
| Forensic visit to the scene, with videography | For every offence punishable with seven years or more — which includes Section 109 — the officer in charge must cause a forensic expert to visit the scene to collect evidence, and cause the process to be videographed. There is a phase-in period notified State by State, so check whether it has been notified for Delhi before relying on it. Where it applied and was not done, that is a legitimate line of cross-examination. |
| Progress of the investigation within 90 days | The police must inform the informant or the victim of the progress of the investigation within ninety days, by any means including electronic communication. There was no equivalent in the old code, and complainants in stalled cases almost never invoke it. |
| The victim must be heard before withdrawal | No court may allow the prosecution to be withdrawn without giving the victim an opportunity of being heard. Again, entirely new. |
| Timelines on committal and charge | Committal proceedings are to be completed within ninety days of cognizance, extendable for written reasons; and the charge is to be framed in writing within sixty days from the first hearing on charge. These give an accused a concrete basis to press a case that has stalled. |
Two older protections also carry over and are worth knowing: information may be given at any police station irrespective of jurisdiction, and may be given electronically — though an electronic complaint only goes on record once it is signed within three days.
The sequence. Information goes to any Delhi police station, jurisdictional or otherwise. Because Section 109 is cognizable and carries ten years, registration is mandatory and no preliminary enquiry is available at this punishment level. The injured person is taken to a hospital and a medico-legal report is prepared, recording the alleged history, the injuries and the doctor's opinion on their nature. That opinion, in practice, is what determines the section on the FIR.
The court. Section 109 is exclusively triable by the Court of Session. In Delhi the trial is before an Additional Sessions Judge of the district in which the police station falls, after committal by a Magistrate. Delhi has eleven district courts housed in seven complexes — Tis Hazari, Patiala House, Karkardooma, Rohini, Dwarka, Saket and Rouse Avenue. Bail lies to the Sessions Court and then the High Court of Delhi.
A complainant's practical points: obtain a copy of the FIR, which must be given free of cost; obtain a copy of the medico-legal report and of any subsequent or final opinion early, because the final opinion frequently changes the classification; and invoke the ninety-day progress-update duty if the investigation stalls.
Victim compensation is available under the Delhi Victims Compensation Scheme, 2018 — not under a head labelled "attempt to murder", but under the injury-based heads, which apply irrespective of the section charged. For the typical case — a stab or blunt-force injury opined grievous, without permanent disability — the applicable head is grievous physical injury, published at ₹1,00,000 to ₹2,00,000. Higher figures apply to permanent disability, graduated by percentage, and to loss of life.
The features worth knowing: a claim may be made by the victim or dependants, on the SHO's recommendation, on a court order, or directly to the District Legal Services Authority at the court complex, with the FIR copy and medical reports. Interim relief for immediate medical needs is available before the trial concludes. Minors receive additional compensation. And the claim must be made within three years of the offence or the conclusion of the trial.
Free legal aid covers both sides of these cases. A woman or a child qualifies without any income test, as do persons with disabilities, acid attack survivors, and members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The general income ceiling is around three lakh a year, and four lakh for senior citizens and transgender persons. But the category that matters most here is different:
Section 109 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, split into sub-sections (1) and (2). Section 109(1) is the offence and its punishment; 109(2) deals with an attempt by a person already under a sentence of imprisonment for life.
No — and this is the trap. Attempt to culpable homicide, the old IPC 308, is now Section 110. BNS 308 is extortion. Anyone who knows "308" from the Penal Code and looks up BNS 308 lands on a completely different offence. If you see 308 on a post-July-2024 FIR, it is an extortion allegation.
Yes. IPC 109 was abetment, and abetment is now BNS 49. So the number 109 means abetment in the old code and attempt to murder in the new one. On a charge-sheet spanning the changeover this matters a great deal.
Essentially not at all. Section 109(1) reproduces IPC 307 word for word. The only substantive addition in the whole area is in 109(2), which now offers imprisonment for the remainder of natural life as an alternative to death — where the Penal Code offered death alone.
No. Clause 107 was the numbering in the withdrawn Bill of August 2023, which never became law. The enacted Act numbers it 109. A page quoting 107 is quoting a document Parliament replaced.
Yes. The section prescribes a punishment for the attempt on its own and then adds "and if hurt is caused" as an escalation — so the base case is an attempt with no hurt. The statute's own illustration is a person firing at another with intent to kill, with no stated consequence.
No. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that it is not necessary for bodily harm capable of causing death to have been inflicted, and that an accused cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries were simple. The determinative question is intention or knowledge, not the nature of the injury.
Also no, and this is where cases are won. In May 2026 the Supreme Court held that the gravity of an injury by itself cannot be determinative, even where the injury is opined to be "dangerous to life", unless the required mental element is proved. The conviction in that case was altered from attempt to murder down to grievous hurt.
The weapon, the words spoken, whether there was prior enmity or a sudden quarrel, which part of the body was targeted, the extent of the injuries, and the manner of the assault — including whether the accused persisted after the other person had fallen. That last factor decides a great many real cases.
No. Section 109 is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and triable exclusively by a Court of Session. Bail lies to the Sessions Court and thereafter the High Court, and anticipatory bail is available — there is no statutory bar.
Not for Section 109. That regime applies to offences punishable up to seven years, and Section 109 carries ten years and life exposure. But it does apply to Section 110, whose limbs cap at three and seven years. That is the strongest practical reason to contest the characterisation before an arrest rather than after one.
It cannot be compounded — the compounding provision is exhaustive and neither Section 109 nor Section 110 is in it. A High Court may quash on a genuine settlement, and Delhi and the Supreme Court have both done so where the injuries were minor and the dispute essentially private. Equally, Delhi has refused where a deadly weapon caused injuries capable of causing death. Anyone told "307 can be settled" is being misled; anyone told it "can never be quashed" is also being misled.
None for Section 109 — the punishment exceeds three years, so no limitation applies. But the unaggravated limb of Section 110 carries exactly three years, which brings it inside the three-year bar. That is the only provision in this cluster with a limitation exposure.
The Court of Session of the district in which the police station falls, after committal by a Magistrate. Delhi has eleven district courts in seven complexes. The Sanhita now sets a ninety-day norm for completing committal and sixty days for framing the charge after the first hearing on it.
For every offence punishable with seven years or more — which includes Section 109 — the Sanhita requires a forensic expert to visit the scene and the process to be videographed. This is being phased in by each State. Where it was required and not done, that is a legitimate line of cross-examination.
Yes. Under the Delhi Victims Compensation Scheme, 2018 a person with a grievous injury can apply to the District Legal Services Authority — on the SHO's recommendation, on a court order, or directly. Interim relief for immediate medical needs is available. The claim window is three years.
Yes, and this is worth knowing at the police station. Any person in custody is entitled to free legal aid regardless of income. Since Section 109 is non-bailable, an arrested person qualifies immediately.
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